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On February 24, 1803, the United States Supreme Court, for 
the first time in recorded opinion, invalidated an Act of Congress in 
the case of Marbury v. Madison. I Twenty-two years later, Justice 
John Gibson of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court wrote a now-fa-
mous dissenting opinion in the case of Eakin v. Raub, discussing at 
length the circumstances in which judges may and may not declare 
statutes unconstitutional.2 This dissent, obscure until its redis-
covery late in the nineteenth century by James Bradley Thayer,3 has 
come to be regarded by many scholars as the most elaborate, if not 
the only, contemporaneous rebuttal of Marshall's argument in sup-
port of judicial review. 
Statements of the alleged Marbury-Eakin collision are so nu-
merous as to defy computation. For example, Donald 0. Dewey, 
author of the only full-length book devoted exclusively to Marbury, 
claims that "[b]y 1825, when Justice John B. Gibson of the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court undertook a refutation of Marshall in 
Eakin v. Raub, he complained that judicial review had become 'a 
professional dogma' resting on faith rather than reason."4 Rocco 
Tresolini and Martin Shapiro remark that, "The most effective an-
swer to Marshall's argument was given in a dissenting opinion writ-
ten by Judge Gibson of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in the 
relatively unimportant case of Eakin v. Raub, decided in 1825."s 
More recently, Stanley I. Kutler says that Judge Gibson's dissent is 
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the "classic judicial refutation" of Marshall's position, and may be 
viewed as a "point-by-point refutation of Marshall's rationale and 
as a rejoinder in logical reasoning."6 According to Robert F. 
Cushman, Gibson's opinion is perhaps "the most lucid and care-
fully reasoned answer to Marshall's argument in Marbury v. 
Madison."7 Rossum and Tarr claim that Gibson "effectively 
presents, in a dissenting opinion the opposite side of the argument 
made by Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury v. Madison."s 
In a more moderate vein, Feeley and Krislov appear to per-
ceive a less violent incompatibility between Marbury and Eakin; 
they note that "Gibson was dealing with the Pennsylvania Constitu-
tion."9 The implication is that the United States Constitution, Mar-
shall's subject, is a different matter. Albert B. Saye observes that 
"Justice Gibson begins by pointing out that at common law the 
English judges had no power to pass upon the validity of statutes 
and that no express grant of such power is found in the Constitu-
tion."JO Saye does not, however, say which constitution he thinks 
Gibson was discussing. John Schmidhauser, after commenting 
upon the dearth of contemporaneous criticism of Marbury's judicial 
review holding, asserts that judicial review in relation to the separa-
tion of powers was fully discussed in Eakin .11 Like Saye, 
Schmidhauser does not reveal which separation doctrine he thinks 
Gibson discussed. Finally, Peter Woll, who perhaps approaches 
more closely than anyone else the assertion of a less-than-complete 
incompatibility between Marbury and Eakin, nonetheless reads 
Gibson's argument as a rebuttal to Marshall's alleged implication of 
"a general judicial power of review over legislative acts under all 
circumstances." 12 
In short, the Marbury-Eakin commentary appears to fall into 
two general categories. One group of writers perceives a stark con-
frontation between Marshall's and Gibson's judicial philosophies. 
The other group finds a less sharp conflict, yet enough incompatibil-
ity to justify setting the opinions alongside one another as represen-
tative of differing conceptions of the judicial function in the United 
States. 
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My aim is to provide an alternative account of the relation be-
tween the two opinions, suggesting that they are largely if not 
wholly consistent, and that the infliction of an Eakin-Marbury di-
chotomy upon several generations of students in constitutional law 
courses may have contributed more to misunderstanding than to 
enlightenment. In order to establish the plausibility of such an in-
terpretation, it is necessary to examine the opinions more closely, 
and to perform some rudimentary exegesis on each. 
I 
Eakin v. Raub involved disputed land titles. The issue was the 
effect of Pennsylvania's statute of limitations on plaintiff's recovery. 
Plaintiff's counsel had suggested, during oral argument, that the in-
terpretation of the statute contended for by defendant would render 
it unconstitutional, and oblige the court to rule accordingly. The 
court declined, however, to adopt such an interpretation and so 
avoided passing upon the constitutionality of the law.IJ Refusing to 
skirt the issue completely, Justice Tilghman, in his opinion for the 
majority, offered the following dictum: 
I adhere to the opinion which I have frequently expressed, that when a judge is 
convinced, beyond doubt, that an act has been passed in violation of the constitu· 
tion, he is bound to declare it void, by his oath, by his duty to the party who has 
brought the cause before him, and to the people, the only source of legitimate 
power, who, when they formed the constitution of the state, expressly declared that 
certain things 'were excepted out of the general powers of government, and should 
forever remain inviolate. •14 
In dissent, Justice Gibson responded to this passage by draw-
ing a distinction between "political" and "civil" judicial powers. 
Civil powers are the ordinary powers of courts. They derive from 
the common law and do not require a constitutional grant, although 
of course a constitution may withdraw or limit them. Political pow-
ers, by contrast, are extraordinary. They exist only in consequence 
of express constitutional grants, or by "irresistible implication from 
the nature of the government." Since every power "by which one 
organ of the government is enabled to control another, or to exert 
an influence over its acts, is a political power," it follows that judi-
cial annulment oflegislation is "extraordinary," and improper with-
out an express constitutional grant of such power, or by "irresistible 
13. Eakin v. Raub, 12 Serg. and Rawle 330, 333-39 (Pa. 1825). 
14. Id. at 339. Justice Tilghman was certainly consistent throughout. He had been 
counsel in Coopet v. Telfair, decided by the United States Supreme Court some three years 
prior to the decision in Marbury, and had made a similar argument at that time. 4 U.S. (4 
Dall.) 14, 16-17 (1800). The argument was accepted by the Court. 
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implication from the nature of the goveroment."1s 
An "irresistible implication," Gibson explained, would arise 
only in the exceedingly rare case of a legislative usurpation so 
"monstrous" as to work a change "in the very structure of the gov-
ernment," and bring about a revolution: "By this, I mean, that 
while the citizen should resist with pike and gun, the judge might 
co-operate with habeas corpus and mandamus . . . . [B]ut this is 
far from proving the judiciary to be a peculiar organ, under the con-
stitution, to prevent legislative encroachment on the powers re-
served by the people; and this is all that I contend it is not."16 
To the casual reader, this argument sounds like a rejection of 
Marbury. Indeed, Gibson himself said that Marshall was wrong, 
and he cogently rebutted several of Marshall's arguments: that ju-
dicial review is entailed by a written constitution; or by the fact that 
the legislature is subordinate to the constitution; or by the necessity 
of deciding cases; or by the judicial function of deciding what the 
law is; or by the judges' oath to support the Constitution; or by the 
supposed impropriety of giving effect to an unconstitutional law. 
Justice Gibson saw that most if not all of these arguments beg the 
question, for 
the foundation of every argument in favor of the right of the judiciary, is found, at 
last, to be an assumption of the whole ground in dispute. 
The constitution and the right of the legislature to pass the act, may be in 
collision; but is that a legitimate subject for judicial determination? If it be, the 
judiciary must be a peculiar organ, to revise the proceedings of the legislature, and 
to correct its mistakes: and in what part of the constitution are we to look for this 
proud preeminence? 17 
Although the general tenor of Gibson's dissent was hostile to 
judicial review, a careful reading reveals some complexities. In the 
first place, Gibson believed that judges are entitled to ignore statutes 
that conflict with constitutional provisions establishing "rules for 
the judiciary." Most constitutional provisions, he observed, "are to 
be carried into effect immediately by the legislature, and only medi-
ately, if at all, by the judiciary." "Rule[s] for the judiciary," by 
contrast, are addressed to the judges. Gibson opined that in Penn-
sylvania's constitution "perhaps" one provision was of this type: 
"to regulate the style of process, and establish an appropriate form 
of conclusion in criminal prosecutions .... "1s 
Justice Gibson was also careful to distinguish between nullifi-
15. Eakin, 12 Serg. and Rawle at 345-46. 
16. /d. at 355. 
17. /d. at 347, 353. 
18. /d. at 346-47. 
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cation of a law that conflicts with a state constitution and nullifica-
tion of one that conflicts with the Federal Constitution. While he 
found no warrant for judicial "preeminence" in the state constitu-
tion, Gibson was confident that exactly the reverse is true "in re-
gard to an act of assembly, which is found to be in collision with the 
constitution, laws or treaties of the United States." To support this 
proposition he invoked the clear logic of article VI: "By becoming 
parties to the federal constitution, the states have agreed to several 
limitations of their individual sovereignty, to enforce which, it was 
thought to be absolutely necessary, to prevent them from giving ef-
fect to laws in violation of those limitations, through the instrumen-
tality of their own judges."l9 
If a state violates the Federal Constitution: 
By the third article and second section, appellate jurisdiction of all cases arising 
under the constitution and laws of the United States, is reserved to the federal judi-
ciary, under such regulations as congress may prescribe; and in execution of this 
provision, congress has prescribed regulations for removing into the supreme court 
of the United States, all causes decided by the highest court of judicature of any 
state, which involve the construction of the constitution, or of any law or treaty of 
the United States.20 
Although Gibson is commenting on the power of the United States 
Supreme Court to invalidate state laws that conflict with the Consti-
tution, there is no reason to doubt that he was thoroughly familiar 
with the "removal" provision of which he spoke. It was, of course, 
the Judiciary Act of 1789, Section 25.21 This provision granted to 
the Court the power to review any decision of a state court of final 
resort wherein the validity of a federal law, among other things, was 
questioned. An affirmance by the Supreme Court of an invalidation 
of federal law below amounts, of course, to a final declaration of 
unconstitutionality. The Court therefore had such authority long 
before its decision in Marbury v. Madison. I shall later argue that 
Gibson was surely aware of this implication of the Judiciary Act, 
and thus would not have been disturbed by the power of the 
Supreme Court to invalidate federal laws in appropriate circum-
stances. I shall also argue that the circumstances of Marbury were 
among those which Justice Gibson would have considered 
appropriate. 
II 
Gibson's Eakin dissent would be of little interest today were it 
19. /d. at 355-56. 
20. !d. at 356. 
21. I Stat. 73, at 85-86 (1789). 
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not regarded as a rebuttal of Marbury. The relevant portion of the 
Marbury opinion, justifying the Court's refusal to apply an uncon-
stitutional statute, contains two segments. The first is an argument 
in support of the conclusion that "an act of the legislature, repug-
nant to the constitution, is void. "22 The second is an altogether 
different argument to the conclusion that "courts, as well as other 
departments, are bound by that instrument."23 Marshall explicitly 
recognized the distinction which is the heart of the Eakin dissent: 
between (1) a law being a nullity due to its collision with the Consti-
tution, on the one hand; and (2) a court's right to decide authorita-
tively whether such a collision exists, on the other.24 Gibson's 
opinion, it will be recalled, is devoted entirely to a qualified rejec-
tion of the latter idea. 
To be sure, Marshall invokes three of the principles which Gib-
son later challenges in Eakin: that the Constitution is a law of supe-
rior obligation;25 the nature of the written constitution;26 and the 
idea that unconstitutional statutes are "ipso facto" void.27 But in 
Marshall's argument these are all steps toward the conclusion with 
which Gibson agreed: that a statute contrary to the Constitution is 
a nullity. Since none of these notions are used in support of Mar-
shall's second argument, they have no application to Gibson's point 
of view. 
Marshall begins his discussion of whether the Court may de-
cide that an Act of Congress is invalid by asking a rhetorical ques-
tion: "If an act of the legislature, repugnant to the constitution, is 
void, does it, notwithstanding its invalidity, bind the courts, and 
oblige them to give it effect?"2s His answer commences with what 
is perhaps the most famous sentence in the opinion: "It is emphati-
cally the province and duty of the judicial department to say what 
the law is."29 Unfortunately, the qualification which follows has 
too often been ignored: "Those who apply the rule to particular 
cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule . . . . So 
. . if both the law and the constitution apply to a particular case, 
22. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176-77 (1803). 
23. /d. at 177-80. 
24. The Marbury language, id. at 177, is as follows: "If an act of the legislature, repug-
nant to the constitution, is void, does it, notwithstanding its invalidity, bind the courts, and 
oblige them to give it effect?" Compare this with Gibson's question in Eakin, 12 Serg. and 
Rawle at 347: "The constitution and the right of the legislature to pass the act, may be in 
collision; but is that a legitimate subject for judicial determination?" 
25. Marbury, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) at 177. 
26. /d. 
27. /d. 
28. /d. 
29. /d. 
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. . . the court must either decide that case conformably to the law, 
disregarding the constitution; or conformably to the constitution, 
disregarding the law .... "3o 
In other words, the answer to Marshall's rhetorical question is 
both affirmative and negative. The courts are not obliged to give 
effect to an unconstitutional law when, as in Marbury, both the 
Constitution and the law are applicable to a particular case which 
the court has a duty to decide. This concept is more ambiguous 
than a modern reader may realize. It may be interpreted as a justifi-
cation of the broad judicial review that ultimately prevailed in this 
country. Gibson himself respectfully expressed disagreement with 
Marshall; so he evidently interpreted Marbury broadly. But Mar-
shall's formulation is also amenable to a much narrower interpreta-
tion. After all, Gibson subscribed to precisely the same concept in 
Eakin, while observing that only one provision in Pennsylvania's 
constitution "furnishes a rule for the judiciary," which "the legisla-
ture cannot alter, because it cannot alter the constitution. In all 
other cases, . . . the constitution and act of assembly, . . . do not 
furnish conflicting rules applicable to the point before the court; nor 
is it at all necessary, that the one or the other of them should give 
way."31 
Pennsylvania's Constitution of 1790 contains no jurisdictional 
provisions comparable to those in article III. Although Gibson did 
not address this point in his Eakin dissent, it seems likely that he 
would have considered article III "a rule for the judiciary." If so, 
he would have agreed with the result in Marbury. 
Marshall mentioned several clauses of the Constitution in the 
course of his argument that, "In some cases then, the constitution 
must be looked into by the judges."32 These were: (1) article III, 
section 2, wherein the "judicial power of the United States is ex-
tended to all cases arising under the constitution;" (2) article I, sec-
tion 9, prohibiting passage of a "bill of attainder or ex post facto 
law," and likewise prohibiting taxes or duties "laid on articles ex-
ported from any state;" (3) article III, section 3, prohibiting convic-
tion for treason "unless on the testimony of two witnesses to the 
same overt act, or on confession in open court." 
Concerning the last of these, Marshall's reasoning resembles 
Gibson's analysis of the provision regulating "the style of process" 
and establishing "an appropriate form of conclusion in criminal 
30. /d. at 177-78. 
31. Eakin, 12 Serg. and Rawle at 347. 
32. Marbury, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) at 179. 
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prosecutions .... "33 The treason clause, says Marshall, is "ad-
dressed especially to the courts. It prescribes, directly for them, a 
rule of evidence not to be departed from. "34 And according to Gib-
son, whenever "the judiciary, and not the legislature, is the immedi-
ate organ to execute" a constitutional provision, "they are bound by 
it, in preference to any act of assembly to the contrary; in such 
cases, the constitution is a rule to the courts. "3s In other words, 
provisions like the treason clause are of a "judiciary nature."36 
Concerning article III's "arising under" provision, we have al-
ready observed that Gibson regarded it as authority for Section 25 
of the Judiciary Act of 1789. This section authorized the Supreme 
Court of the United States to review any "final judgment or decree 
... , in the highest court of law or equity of a state ... ; where is 
drawn in question the validity of a treaty or statute of, or an author-
ity exercised under the United States, and the decision is against 
their validity; ... "37 Such a decision may be "reversed or affirmed 
in the Supreme Court of the United States upon a writ of error."3s 
Now, it follows straightforwardly from this authorization, that if 
the highest court of a state enforces, for example, the article I, sec-
tion 9 prohibition that "no tax or duty shall be laid on articles ex-
ported from any state" against Congress, the Supreme Court may 
affirm the judgment of that state court, thereby invalidating the act 
of a co-ordinate branch of government. 
Gibson surely knew this. Perhaps that is why he so carefully 
confined his opinion "on the abstract right of the judiciary to de-
clare an unconstitutional act of the legislature void," to the "plain 
difference, hitherto unnoticed, between acts that are repugnant to 
the constitution of the particular state, and acts that are repugnant 
to the constitution of the United States;" his opinion being "that the 
judiciary is bound to execute the former, but not the latter. "39 Else-
33. Eakin, 12 Serg. and Rawle at 347. 
34. Marbury, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) at 179. 
35. Eakin, 12 Serg. and Rawle at 352. 
36. The phrase "judiciary nature" appears in the records of the Federal Convention and 
is arguably the primary rationale for extending a limited judicial veto to the Court. 2 M. 
FARRAND, RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 430 (1911). According to Farrand, 
the framers accepted the extension of the federal judicial power to cases "arising under the 
Constitution, Laws, and Treaties of the United States" only after it had been "generally sup-
posed that the jurisdiction given was constructively limited to cases of a Judiciary nature." 
/d. According to B. F. Wright, "There is room to differ as to Madison's meaning of 'judiciary 
nature' here, but at least it would appear to represent a theory of judicial review which did 
not recognize the courts as the exclusive or final interpreters of all parts of the Constitution." 
B. WRIGHT, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 18 n.24 (1967). 
37. I Stat. 73, at 85 (1789). 
38. /d. at 86. 
39. Eakin, 12 Serg. and Rawle at 344-45. 
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where, while commenting upon the allegation that judicial power to 
nullify statutes is legitimate because, when exercised, "the judiciary 
does no positive act, but merely refuses to be instrumental in giving 
effect to an unconstitutional law," Gibson remarks that this 
is nothing more than a repetition, in a different form, of the argument-that an 
unconstitutional law is ipso facto void; for a refusal to act under the law, must be 
founded on a right in each branch to judge of the acts of all the others, before it is 
bound to exercise its functions to give those acts effect. No such right is recognised 
in the different branches of the national government, except the judiciary (and that, 
too, on account of the peculiar provisions of the constitution) .... 40 
He did not identify these "peculiar provisions," but they may 
have been the ones that Marshall had invoked in Marbury to sup-
port the notion that the Constitution may be "looked into by the 
judges. "4' 
In the American federal system, the national government is 
one of purely delegated authority, while state governments are 
not.42 The tenth amendment reserves all "powers not delegated to 
the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the 
States," to the "States respectively, or to the people;"43 acts of na-
tional legislation not pursuant to the Constitution are, indeed, "ipso 
facto" void. 44 
Such, however, is not the case with state statutes. They, ac-
cording to Justice Gibson, "are, in no case, to be treated as ipso 
facto void, except where they would produce a revolution in the 
40. Jd. at 351. 
41. Marbury, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) at 179. 
42. Madison, in THE FEDERALIST No. 45, points to the practical result of the idea: 
"The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the Federal Government are few and 
defined. Those which are to remain in the State Governments are numerous and indefinite. 
The former will be exercised principally on external objects, as war, peace, negotiation, and 
foreign commerce; with which last the power of taxation will for the most part be connected. 
The powers reserved to the several States will extend to all the objects, which, in the ordinary 
course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the people; and the internal 
order, improvement, and prosperity of the State." THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 313 (J. 
Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961). According to Plano and Greenberg, "Although it was gener-
ally understood that the framers intended that the states would retain all powers not prohib-
ited by the Constitution or delegated to the national government, the people insisted upon an 
express provision to that effect." The tenth amendment, of course, was the result. J. PLANO 
& M. GREENBERG, THE AMERICAN POLITICAL DICTIONARY 51 (7th ed. 1985). 
43. "It is not possible to make a definitive list of state powers since, in the very nature of 
the federal system, the states may exercise any power that is not delegated to the national 
government .... These powers are frequently referred to as 'residuary.'" J. PLANO & M. 
GREENBERG, supra note 42, at 48. 
44. "Under American federalism, the national government is one of delegated powers. 
With the exception of foreign affairs, it must find justification for its actions in a specifically 
authorized power, or in one that can be reasonably implied from those specifically author-
ized. The national government does not possess unlimited or general governmental power 
but only such power as is given to it in the Constitution." /d. at 36-37. 
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government; and that, to avoid them, requires the act of some tribu-
nal competent, under the constitution (if any such there be), to pass 
upon their validity. All that remains, therefore, is, to inquire 
whether the judiciary or the people are that tribunal."4s Surely it 
pays more of the respect which Gibson's great opinion deserves, to 
treat it rather as an exegesis of the tenth amendment, than as a 
quibble with Marbury v. Madison. 
III 
The Supreme Court did not invoke Marbury as authority for 
judicial power to nullify statutes until Mugler v. Kansas in 1887.46 
Marbury, shrouded in relative obscurity until its resurrection in 
1868 by Thomas M. Cooley in the most important legal treatise of 
the PC?riod,47 was cited with increasing frequency by a group of legal 
45. Eakin, 12 Serg. and Rawle at 350. 
46. 123 U.S. 623 (1887). Quoting Marbury, the Mugler Court asked, "'To what pur-
pose ... are powers limited, and to what purpose is that limitation committed to writing, if 
these limits may, at any time, be passed by those intended to be restrained? The distinction 
between a government with limited and unlimited powers is abolished, if those limits do not 
confine the persons on whom they are imposed, and if acts prohibited and acts allowed are of 
equal obligation.'" /d. at 661. Now, as we have already seen, this segment of Marshall's 
argument was used in Marbury to support the conclusion that legislative acts contrary to the 
Constitution are void, not that courts have the power to refuse application of them. But the 
Mug/er Court used the passage in support of the proposition that "the courts must obey the 
Constitution rather than the law-making department of government, and must, upon their 
own responsibility, determine whether, in any particular case, these limits have been passed." 
/d. Adding insult to injury, from an historical point of view, the Court then proceeded to 
employ Marbury in the service of the developing doctrine of substantive due process. All 
this, in a passage which was essentially dicta, since in Mugler the Court upheld a state prohi-
bition of manufacture and sale of intoxicating beverages! 
47. Cooley, after having spoken favorably conceringjudicial power to invalidate legisla-
tion, says: "The same conclusion is reached by stating in consecutive order a few familiar 
maxims of the law. The administration of public justice is referred to the courts. To perform 
this duty, the first requisite is to ascertain the facts, and the next to determine the law that is 
applicable. The constitution is the fundamental law of the State, in opposition to which any 
other law, or any direction or decree, must be inoperative and void. If, therefore, such other 
law, direction, or decree seems to be applicable to the facts, but on comparison with the 
fundamental law it is found to be in conflict, the court, in declaring what the law of the case 
is, must necessarily determine its invalidity, and thereby in effect annul it. The right and 
power of the courts to do this are so plain, and the duty is so generally-we may now say 
universally-conceded, that we should not be justified in wearying the patience of the reader 
in quoting from the very numerous authorities upon the subject." Then follows the citation 
of Marbury. T. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH 
REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER Of THE STATES Of THE AMERICAN UNION 45-46 
(1868). The reader should be reminded of our previous discussion of Judge Gibson's Eakin 
dissent, where it was shown: (I) that any argument from a premise such as "The Constitu-
tion is a fundamental law" to the conclusion that "The courts have the power to annul stat-
utes" is essentially question-begging (i.e., the validity of the argument virtually depends upon 
the insertion of something very much like the conclusion as an unstated premise); and (2) that 
no such argument was made by Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury. Cooley's reference to 
Marbury is therefore inappropriate, and his argument about judicial power unfounded. 
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thinkers evidently seeking an adequate legal foundation for the de-
veloping doctrine of fourteenth amendment substantive due pro-
cess.4s This movement touched off a furious debate over the role of 
the judiciary in American society, one of the high points of which 
was the appearance of Thayer's classic article in 1893.49 Beginning 
in 1895, the left wing of the American bar launched a concerted 
attack upon Marbury, alleging that the doctrine of judicial nullifica-
tion had not been intended by the framers, and had been an inven-
tion of the Marshall Court. so This outburst was matched blow-for-
blow by the conservative wing of the bar, which by 1903 had man-
aged to elevate Marbury to a status commensurate with the Decla-
ration of Independence and the Constitution itself.st Neither side 
doubted that Marbury had authorized a broad role for the courts. 
It was but a short step to the famous assertion of Albert J. 
Beveridge, Marshall's most important biographer, that Marbury 
"for perfectly calculated audacity, has few parallels in judicial his-
tory."s2 Not long before Beveridge wrote, EdwardS. Corwin, in an 
48. I. BROWN, SHORT STUDIES OF GREAT LAWYERS 206·07 (1878). E. Phelps, An-
nual Address, in REP. OF THE A.B.A. !73-92 (1879). For an excellent study of the effect of 
the American legal profession upon the development of the doctrine of laissez-faire in the 
Supreme Court, see B. TWISS, LAWYERS AND THE CoNSTITUTION: How LAISSEZ FAIRE 
CAME TO THE SUPREME COURT (1942). See also B. COXE, AN EssAY ON JUDICIAL POWER 
AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL LEGISLATION (1893); Doolittle, The Veto Power of the Supreme 
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